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Conceivability arguments are quite common in philosophy. Given the continued prevalence of such 
arguments, the philosopher would do well to consider whether the inference from conceivability to 
possibility is in fact justified. In this paper, I reject Alex Byrne’s skeptical arguments against David 
Chalmers’s account of modal imagination. I suggest that, in regard to mental imagery, Byrne’s account 
of sensuous imagination is committed to the dubious claim that mental images are sufficient to 
individuate imaginings, whereas Chalmers’s account is not. On the contrary, in order to be successful, 
some imaginings must involve or co-occur with further, non-imagistic features or faculties that are 
necessary for their individuation. I briefly consider some such possible features and conclude that modal 
imagination as conceived of by Chalmers does not reduce to sensuous imagination. Consequently, the 
reliability of modal imagination as a guide to possibility is not necessarily undermined by Byrne’s 








Conceivability arguments are quite common in philosophy. Broadly speaking, such 
arguments include a claim that some state of affairs is conceivable, from which it 
supposedly follows that the same state of affairs is (at least) possible. Familiar 
representatives of this kind include Cartesian arguments for mind-body dualism, 
contemporary zombie arguments in favor of dualism, and some formulations of the 
ontological argument for the existence of God. Given the continued prevalence of such 
arguments, the philosopher would do well to consider whether the inference from 
conceivability to possibility is in fact justified. Many capable philosophers have 
defended the basic validity of this move, offering thorough and careful accounts of 
what conceivability is and of what kind of justification it affords. Stephen Yablo, for 
example, has argued that imagining1 that p is a reliable defeasible indicator that 
                                                          
1 Or “conceiving.” Henceforth, I favor the term imagination and its cognates, though I will later 
distinguish between Amy Kind’s image-based account of imagination and what David Chalmers 
calls modal imagination, which, on his account, does not require imagery 
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possibly p, where the relevant kind of imagining is “objectual” (Yablo 1993: 27) and 
involves imagining “a world”—or else some fully determinable situation—that seems 
“to verify p” (Yablo 1993: 30). On the other hand, some philosophers have demurred, 
claiming that the leap from conceivability to possibility is not justified. Alex Byrne has 
recently raised several objections to Yablo’s account,2 all of which culminate in the 
overall claim that “sensuous imagination” (2007: 134)—that is, objectual imagination 
in Yablo’s sense—is not a reliable guide to possibility because people of normal 
cognitive capacities can imagine impossibilities. 
 
In this paper, I reject Byrne’s further claim that sensuous imagination and David 
Chalmers’s “modal imagination” (Chalmers 2002: 151) are “one and the same” (Byrne 
2007: 138). To do this, I first sketch accounts of both sensuous imagination and modal 
imagination (§II) and explain Byrne’s alleged reduction of the latter to the former 
(§III). I suggest that, in regard to mental imagery, Byrne’s account of sensuous 
imagination is committed to what Amy Kind calls the “individuative claim” (2001: 99), 
but I argue (in agreement with Kind) that the individuative claim is false: mental 
images are not sufficient to individuate imaginings (§IV). In order to be successful, 
some imaginings must, therefore, involve or co-occur with further, non-imagistic 
features or faculties that are necessary for their individuation. I briefly consider some 
such possible features in §V. I conclude (contra Byrne) that modal imagination as 
conceived of by Chalmers does not reduce to sensuous imagination because a 
successful account of modal imagination can easily sidestep the individuative claim 
while accommodating non-imagistic features that serve to individuate imaginings. 
Therefore, the reliability of modal imagination as a guide to possibility is not 
necessarily undermined by Byrne’s broader critique of sensuous imagination. 
 
II. Sensuous Imagination and Modal Imagination 
 
Byrne’s first suggestion is that in “ordinary talk,” imagining p involves “more than 
merely entertaining p” (2007: 130). In order truly to imagine “that there are tailless 
kangaroos, say . . . Something extra is needed: a mental image of a tailless kangaroo is 
sufficient—and perhaps it is also necessary” (Byrne 2007: 130; emphasis added). Here I 
take Byrne to be saying that, in accordance with everyday usage, to imagine that p, it is 
enough for a person to have a particular mental image as of p. A consequence of this 
view is that the content p of a mental image is uniquely similar to the content p of a 
corresponding sensory experience. “Visualizing,” for instance, “is a special case of 
sensuously imagining” that “involves ‘visual representations’—mental representations 
that are proprietary to the sense of sight. . . . When one visualizes a tiger, one is in a 
state with a distinctively visual content, a pared-down version of the content of the state 
of seeing a tiger” (2007: 135). Extrapolating to purported cases of nonactual 
                                                          
2 In Byrne, A. 2007. Imagination and Possibility. Philosophical Perspectives 21: Philosophy of 
Mind. 
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possibility—such as the existence of a purple polar bear—this account entails that if I 
can successfully visualize a purple polar bear, then, in doing so, I succeed in sensuously 
imagining a purple polar bear—and according to Hart, this would mean that a purple 
polar bear could have existed.3 Similarly, if I can successfully visualize myself winning 
a gold medal in the 100-meter dash, then, in doing so, I succeed in sensuously 
imagining myself winning a gold medal in the 100-meter dash, by which I gain prima 
facie justification for my belief that such a situation is possible, broadly speaking. In 
both of these cases, my imagination is directed at something—a fictional creature on 
the one hand, a counterfactual situation on the other. In other words, my imaginings 
have an “objectual character” (Byrne 2007: 135). Per Byrne’s account of sensuous 
imagining, this objectual character ensures that a particular set of mental images (where 
a set might contain a single image) is sufficient to represent the particular content of 
any imagining. 
 
David Chalmers thinks that his account of modal imagination has a similarly “mediated 
objectual character” (Chalmers 2002: 151), but he denies that a particular set of mental 
images is sufficient to represent the particular propositional content of each and every 
imagining. On Chalmers’s view, to modally imagine a situation is “to imagine (in some 
sense) a specific configuration of objects and properties” (2002: 150). More precisely, 
“One modally imagines that P if one modally imagines a world that verifies P, or a 
situation that verifies P” (Chalmers 2002: 151). Chalmers is confident that modal 
imagination “is used . . . as a label for a certain sort of familiar mental act” (2002: 151). 
However, Chalmers also thinks that many imaginable situations are not potential 
objects of a perceptual experience and thus cannot be sufficiently represented by mental 
imagery. He contends that a situation can fail to be the potential object of a perceptual 
experience in three ways: (1) the situation can lie “beyond the scale of perception” 
(Chalmers 2002: 151), as in the case of an electron orbiting the nucleus of an atom; (2) 
the situation can be “unperceivable in principle,” as in the case of “an invisible being 
that leaves no trace on perception” (Chalmers 2002: 151); and (3) the situation can be 
“perceptually indistinguishable” (Chalmers 2002: 151) from another situation, as in the 
case of a configuration of chess pieces that amounts to a win for one player and a loss 
for the other. 
 
In cases like these—which Chalmers assumes are imaginable—mental imagery is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to represent the particular content of each imagining; 
instead, “One has a positive intuition of a certain configuration within a world, and 
takes that configuration to satisfy a certain description” (Chalmers 2002: 151; emphasis 
added). In modally imagining Garry Kasparov’s defeating Anatoly Karpov, I might 
imagine a particular configuration of pieces on a chessboard. In modally imagining that 
I am President of the United States, I might imagine certain relevant objects or states of 
                                                          
3 “There are no purple polar bears, but each of us is convinced that there could have been, and 
what convinces us is that we can visualize a polar bear dyed purple” (Hart 1988: 30). 
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affairs, such as the tally of winning votes, my various campaign promises, the members 
of my cabinet, and possible decorations for the White House. Chalmers’s preferred 
example is the victory of Germany in the Second World War: “one might imagine a 
world in which certain German armies win certain battles and go on to overwhelm 
Allied forces within Europe” (2002: 151). Chalmers takes this imagined 
(counterfactual) scenario to be a “part” of a possible world “in which Germany won the 
Second World War” (Chalmers 2002: 151)—on which account, Chalmers thinks we are 
justified in believing that Germany could have been victorious. Accordingly, if 
Chalmers is correct, modal imagination is broader than Byrne’s conception of sensuous 
imagination; both types of imagination have an objectual character, but whereas 
sensuous imagination is “grounded in imagery” (Chalmers 2002: 151), modal 
imagination is not. For Chalmers, the upshot is that modal imagination need not involve 
imagery essentially—nor do mental images suffice for the imagination of certain 
situations that are simply not amenable to imagery. 
 
III. The Alleged Reduction 
 
In spite of Chalmers’s claims to the contrary, Byrne insists that modal imagination as 
such reduces to sensuous imagination—they are “one and the same” (Byrne 2007: 
138). Byrne denies that situations such as “Germany’s winning the Second World 
War” (Byrne 2007: 138) are beyond the scope of perception; he thus denies that such 
situations cannot be represented by way of mental imagery. He admits that “One can’t 
see Germany . . . in the way one can see [a] red ball or [a] blue cube” and that “the 
property of winning the Second World War is not a perceptible property . . . in the 
way redness or sphericity are perceptible properties” (2007:138). However, he argues 
that a situation like Germany’s winning the Second World War can still be perceived 
“in a genuine ‘perceptual’ sense” (2007: 138). For instance, if Germany had won the 
Second World War, a person could have seen Hitler waving from the balcony of 
Buckingham Palace, presiding over a file of German soldiers. And if a person could 
have perceived this counterfactual situation, then he or she can, in principle, imagine 
it by way of mental imagery. Byrne concludes from this: “one sees that Germany has 
won the Second World War” (2007: 138). To my mind, this is a very hasty move on 
Byrne’s part. Why should we think that visualizing Hitler waving from the balcony of 
Buckingham Palace while German soldiers file past is sufficient for modally 
imagining that Germany has won the Second World War? Tellingly, Byrne neglects 
to consider each of Chalmers’s criteria for a proposition’s failing to be the potential 
object of a perceptual experience. He seems to focus on the first one, by which some 
situations can fail to be potential objects of perceptual experiences on account of their 
scope. They are not easily taken in “at a glance” like the red ball stacked on the blue 
cube. Byrne’s response to this criterion seems to be that we can perceptually 
experience various constituent parts of certain situations in sequence—adding up the 
parts, we get the whole. Therefore, we can imagine the whole through perception-like 
representations of its parts. Nevertheless, Byrne fails to address Chalmers’s third 
Res Cogitans (2014) 5                                                                                                              Jensen | 65 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
criterion—that one situation can be “perceptually indistinguishable” (Chalmers 2002: 
151) from another—which is problematic for the alleged reduction that Byrne touts, 
as I will now attempt to show. 
 
IV. Mental Images Do Not Individuate Imaginings 
 
Chalmers notes that two (or more) situations might be “perceptually indistinguishable.” 
I agree and claim that at least some imaginable propositions cannot be individuated in 
imagination by a particular set of mental images. This claim is essentially a denial of 
what Amy Kind calls the individuative claim: “that images serve to individuate 
imaginings” (2001: 99). According to the individuative claim, then, each imagining has 
a particular and unique image (or set of images) that distinguishes it from other 
imaginings. Kind herself ultimately rejects the individuative claim after considering a 
variety of alleged counterexamples to her “imagery-based account of imagination” 
(Kind 2001: 85). Kind suggests that the most feasible counterexamples are cases in 
which I might be perfectly capable of imagining x—where x is some determinable 
object—but I supposedly cannot imagine of x that q, where q is some property or state 
of affairs that cannot be visualized. Chalmers’s imagining that Germany won the 
Second World War appears to be an ideal representative of this kind. In imagining this 
situation, I can produce mental images of relevant objects—say, Hitler at Buckingham 
Palace or German soldiers in Trafalgar Square—but I seemingly cannot visualize the 
victoriousness of the Third Reich. This seeming inability might be taken as an 
indication that imagination need not involve imagery essentially. 
 
Kind herself tries to get around this problem by suggesting that only the “essentialist 
claim”—that “mental images play an essential role in the imagination” (Kind 2001: 
95)—is needed for a successful image-based account of imagination. To illustrate, she 
suggests that in imagining Bill Clinton doing budget calculations in his head, imagery 
plays an essential role, but the particular image(s) involved need not be unique to the 
particular imagining. It could be that my imagining Germany winning the Second 
World War features the exact same mental images as my imagining the Fuhrer visiting 
the Queen for tea or German soldiers on parade as part of a diplomatic peacetime 
demonstration or Germany’s having traded capitals with England—namely, Hitler on 
the balcony of Buckingham Palace, German soldiers marching along the Strand, or 
swastikas in Parliament. But if Byrne’s account is correct, this liberality of imagery 
engenders a dilemma for sensuous imagination. On the one hand, if sensuous 
imagination relies on the individuative claim—and I suggest that it does—then it runs 
afoul of counterexamples in which at least two imaginings share the same image(s). On 
the other hand, sensuous imagination might accept only the essentialist claim. But the 
essentialist claim alone does not explain how particular imaginings can be individuated 
and thus fails to explain how an imagining that cannot be individuated—that is, an 
imagining that cannot be specifically identified as representing a particular 
propositional content—could be a successful imagining that p. For my part, I will 
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assume that if I cannot distinguish between my imagining that p and my imagining that 
q, then I have failed to imagine that p or that q.  
 
Now consider the following argument: 
 
(1) All imaginable propositions can be individuated in imagination by a 
particular set of mental images or by some non-imagistic feature or mental 
faculty. 
(2) Some imaginable propositions cannot be individuated in imagination by a 
particular set of mental images. 
(3) Therefore, some imaginable propositions can be individuated in 
imagination only by some non-imagistic feature or mental faculty. 
 
According to my assumption above, a successful imagining that p must not be 
indistinguishable from another imagining that q. As far as the argument is concerned, 
perhaps imagining that p can be individuated by a particular set of mental images or by 
some non-imagistic factor. According to Byrne, sensuous imagining necessarily 
involves the former, which conflicts with (2) in the above argument. Chalmers, on the 
other hand, accepts (2). Consequently, if (2) is true, as I have endeavored to show and 
as Chalmers suspects, then Byrne has failed to show that sensuous imagination and 
modal imagination “are one and the same” (Byrne 2007: 138) because his account of 
sensuous imagination assumes the falsehood of (2). 
 
V. Individuation in Imagination 
 
What Byrne fails to appreciate is that, on Chalmers’s view, modal imagination can 
easily accommodate Kind’s claim that any “imageless” account of imagination will 
ultimately fail while at the same time maintaining that some non-imagistic features or 
mental faculties serve to individuate modal imaginings. But the question remains: what 
might these features or faculties look like? Some possibilities include comprehending 
semantic content—knowing what the relevant signifiers mean—and understanding 
logical relations. A good example of both is Descartes’s chiliagon: in order to modally 
imagine a chiliagon, I might first comprehend what the word chiliagon refers to—
namely, a polygon with 1,000 sides—at which point I might attempt to understand the 
logical relations involved in a polygon’s having 1,000 sides—e.g., that each internal 
angle measures 179.64°. And while Descartes claims that he “cannot imagine the 
thousand sides of a chiliagon as [he does] the three sides of a triangle, nor, so to speak, 
view them as present” (Descartes 2004: 141), Kind might counter that imagining a 
similar shape—a circle, for instance—is an essential part of the overall process. 
Chalmers’s account is not threatened by this claim; he can suggest that, in the case of 
the chiliagon, visualizing something is necessary but not sufficient and that other 
faculties, such as comprehension and understanding, are necessary to individuate 
imaginings. Alternately, in keeping with Kind, he could argue that mental images are 
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not necessary for modal imagination and concede that modal imagination is not 
imagination per se as long as it still provides him with the desired results. 
 
Another possible feature of modal imagination is rational (as opposed to physical) 
intuition. George Bealer characterizes intuition as “a sui generis propositional attitude” 
(Bealer 2002: 74), but as I suggest, it’s quite possible that modal imagination involves 
multiple propositional attitudes, including both imagination in Kind’s sense—where 
imagery plays an essential role—and intuition in Bealer’s sense—which requires no 
imagery whatsoever. In one rendering by Joel Pust, who shares Bealer’s conception of 
intuition as a unique propositional attitude, intuition can be defined as follows: “S has 
the intuition that p if and only if it intellectually seems to S that p” (Pust 9). Thus, 
broadly put, intuition is a kind of seeming. Consider how this concept of intuition might 
apply to Chalmers’s example of “an invisible being that leaves no trace on perception” 
(Chalmers 2002: 151). Here, I imagine something that cannot be perceived and thus 
cannot be visualized. How do I successfully imagine such a being? At least partially, I 
intuit this being’s characteristics. It simply seems to me that this being could exist and 
that I’m imagining it. Chalmers himself suggests this in his paper: 
 
[W]e have an intuition of (or as of) a world in which S, or at least of (or as of) a 
situation in which S, where a situation is (roughly) a configuration of objects 
and properties within a world. We might say that in these cases, one can 
modally imagine that P. (Chalmers 2002: 151). 
 
In imagining the imperceptible being, I intuit a situation: that a being with the 
prescribed properties exists. This intuition at least partially serves to individuate my 




In this paper, I hope to have shown that Chalmers’s modal imagination is distinct from 
Byrne’s presentation of sensuous imagination. While sensuous imagination seems 
committed to the individuative claim, modal imagination is not. Moreover, modal 
imagination can accommodate non-imagistic features that serve to individuate 
imaginings. Thus, Byrne’s broader critique of sensuous imagination does not 
necessarily apply to modal imagination. The general upshot of this conclusion is that, 
regardless of their other virtues or drawbacks, theories of modal knowledge like that 
offered by Chalmers continue to withstand prevalent skeptical challenges and are likely 
to feature prominently in ongoing philosophical inquiry. 
 
                                                          
4 To be clear, Chalmers does not claim that an intuition alone is sufficient to justify belief in 
whatever is intuited—at least not within modal epistemology. My point is simply that intuition 
might help to individuate imaginings in modal imagination. 
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